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1. Introduction 
 
Some enduring location choices challenge the conventional models of competitive location 
allocation.  One such is the persistence of market gardens around large urban centres that use 
locations that are highly valued because of their suitability for all manner of urban uses.  
These areas have been there since the earliest times, featuring prominently in von Thunen's 
original model of land-use [von Thunen (1826)] for instance.  In spite of several revolutions 
in transportation, no reduction in unit transport cost has induced a wholesale relocation to 
cheaper, more distance locations, which would undoubtedly be technically possible under 
conditions of certainty.  Some competing suppliers, however, have become established at 
locations much further out from the market centre, but they are not dominant suppliers in 
spite of land costs being possibly ten-fold lower.  In other words, location and transport costs 
together do not offer a complete explanation of these horticultural businesses' differing 
location decisions. 
 
It is the location of the distant, peripheral suppliers that is consistent with conventional 
models following von Thunen (1826)1.  Such suppliers locate, according to conventional 
models, where the value of the product at the central business district (CBD), given existing 
prices, supply technologies and known demand, is sufficient for the supplier to pay more for 
the location than competing interests.  The von Thunen model assumes, not explains, the 
existence of the CBD and argues that all product values decline at a characteristic rate with 
distance away from the CBD.  The declining net value of products at greater distance leads to 
a declining rent gradient that producers can offer for land.  The rent gradients of expensive 
products are steeper2 than those of cheaper products, so that each product has a range of 
distance or "zone" around the CBD in which it outbids all competing land users.  The same 
von Thunen model, however, does not explain the existence of growers using expensive  
                                                          
 
1 Conventional theory relating to space evolved from von Thunen, through Losch  (1940), Isard  (1956), Greenhut  
(1956), and Alonso  (1964) and is well reviewed by Ponsard  (1983), but has not yet had an impact on the core of 
economic theory.  The conventional rationale is based on the essential features of distance costs, an early form of 
transactions costs, and increasing returns to explain the gains from central locations; neither feature is basic to 
classical economic thought.  A further reason introduced here is the inherent and prevailing uncertainty across 
space from which this paper starts. 
 
2 Most high value products or services are dependent on having excellent market access.  For a supplier to compete 
from a less favourable location with poorer information, there needs to be a significant saving in location rents, and 
so a steep rent gradient results.  For the derivation and full explanation of rent gradients see Alonso  (1964). 
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 urban sites nor does it address the question of the role of the CBD itself, since it assumes that 
prices are known. 
 
In many ways, the more distant, peripheral suppliers are equivalent to "exporters" in terms of 
the rest of the market garden suppliers, with much slower response times and poorer market 
information.  The reasons why they are not dominant provides insights into their operational 
problems and, by contrast, the advantages of locations close to the price-forming centre.  The 
key to the distinction lies in the ability to respond to valuable market information, but this has 
to be coupled with an appropriate operational strategy that maintains viability.  It is both this 
difference in operations, and the type of market information that each values as a result, that 
enables both central and peripheral firms to survive in the same market conditions.  This duo 
of supplier types is, in fact, typical of many industries, such as the local and large national 
bakers in the bread industry, and may well be general to all cases where imported and local 
products coexist. 
 
This paper focuses on the distinction between peripheral and central locations and offers an 
explanation for the central role of the CBD.  Under the assumption of certainty in the von 
Thunen model, and in all classical theory, there is no obvious need for spatially dispersed 
producers and consumers to avoid trading at the nearest convenient site3.  Since both parties 
will be fully informed of their individual circumstances trades between them would seem 
highly feasible and efficient4.  The only possible impediment to their trading is a lack of 
knowledge of the opportunity costs involved; for these to be significant, uncertainty must 
prevail. 
 
The paper begins by establishing the essential role of uncertainty in generating market 
processes and elaborates the gains to all parties that are derivable.  It then examines the 
essential spatial character of the process and its influence on information quality and efficient 
price discovery.  The distinctive consequences of this at locations away from the price-
forming centre are analysed.  Finally the suggested model is used to show how centrally 
placed and 
                                                          
 
3 A recent expression of this difficulty in explaining the existence of cities using conventional economic theory can 
be found in Quigley  (1998): "Without scale economies, there is no role for the city at all." page 130 
 
4 In fact efficiency applies only to the parties involved.  Koopmans & Beckmann (1957) established clearly that the 
outcome of any series of individual trades was arbitrary and so lacked any satisfactory price-forming role for 
efficient market clearance. 
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peripheral agents differ markedly in available information, exposure to uncertainty, market 
opportunities and the processes essential for survival. 
 
 
2. Price Formation with Spatial and Temporal Uncertainty 
 
As a study of the optimum use of scarce resources, economics can be characterised, in a 
world of dynamic uncertainty, as a search for optimum responses to stochastic variations in 
scarcity levels.  Given that agents' circumstances differ and also change individually through 
time, economic behaviour offers not only a means of extending the productivity of resources, 
by investing in infrastructure, for example, but also a means of smoothing out the impact of 
stochastic change by inducing offsetting behaviour among other agents.  The comprehensive 
nature of this adjustment process is achieved both by quantitative adjustments, possibly 
involving trade, at existing prices5, and, more fundamentally, through markets, and their price 
formation mechanisms in particular.  An individual agent, besides storing sufficient surplus to 
cope with anticipated future deficit periods, can use markets to (a) benefit from any additional 
surplus that is above survival needs and (b) to offset unexpectedly large deficits.  Every agent 
in the market is unwittingly induced to cooperate in this through the influence of price 
adjustments.  Economists can surely be excused for getting a buzz over the sheer elegance 
and efficiency of the price mechanism and the comprehensive, system-wide adjustment that it 
achieves.  Furthermore, all this is attainable without the need for fallible human design or 
control, including, arguably, that of the all-knowing Walrasian auctioneer6 when the spatial 
realities outlined here are taken into account. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
5 This quantitative pooling at existing prices is a form of aggregation, in effect, which has a well-known automatic 
advantage in reducing relative variability [See Fisher  (1987) for a definitive statement].  Being accepted as a trader 
in a given market makes the responses to unexpected outcomes as potentially efficient as the total size of the 
market makes possible.  An individual trader can thus enjoy benefits equivalent to being orders of magnitude larger 
in size. 
 
6 It has recently been argued [Heilbroner  (1993) p.87] that Adam Smith was searching for such a mechanism to help 
explain the order created.  This view, however, is not shared by the author. 
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2.1 The Process of Price Discovery 
 
Efficiency is achieved by markets via the mechanism of price formation, in particular the 
determination of a price that relates the aggregate total demand of the represented traders, in a 
precise way, to the aggregate tradeable quantity in the market.  It is largely this quantity, 
predetermined but unknown initially, that provides the driving impulsion for the 
determination of an appropriate market price, since demands are largely based on prior 
knowledge7.  Thus both price and quantity have to be discovered by the process8 of joint 
determination. 
 
2.2 The Reward of Income Smoothing 
 
In normal circumstances, aggregate shortages relative to aggregate demands result in a rise in 
the market price and this acts as a signal to ALL agents to adjust their affairs towards 
alleviating this unusually high price and so moving the market towards its equilibrium level.  
Individual agents confronted with an unexpected drop, say, in their marketable surplus 
quantity, and so contributing to a supply shortage, can benefit from a rise in the market price, 
so that their revenue will vary less than in proportion to their volume of tradeable output9.  In 
the special case of a market demand of unit elasticity the total value of all sales will be 
constant regardless of the level of total supply. Note that any negatively sloped demand curve 
is sufficient to reduce the variation in any seller's total market receipts below that due to 
changes in quantity alone, as long as the change is in the same direction as that in total supply.  
This mechanism significantly reduces the average supplying trader's financial variability, and 
hence their costs from uncertainty.  The steeper the demand curve the greater the reduction in 
seller's financial variability relative to the unforeseen changes in their tradeable volume and 
hence their potential market revenue at expected prices.  Contrariwise, this same mechanism  
                                                          
 
7 This is true even though demand levels relate to estimates of quantities needed in the future.  Current information 
revealed during trading will be added to buyer's information, but it is most unlikely to completely dominate the 
preformed longer-term judgements that potential buyers bring with them. 
 
8 This is a complex procedure involving both price and quantity assessments by traders, in which potential suppliers 
make price-related judgements about what quantity to sell  in the current trading period, given their own available 
supply.  Note that all traders have the opportunity to be "price-makers" by taking disequilibrium positions 
temporarily in anticipation that their non-optimum current position will produce a future profit, given their personal 
assessment of forthcoming market changes.  The importance of property related financial security to sustain the 
risks involved here should not be overlooked; most traders, however, will prefer to use the market less riskily as 
"price-takers", ensuring only that they achieve the best possible current price. 
 
9 Note that supplier's risks can include, in theory, total supply failure; assistance from the market mechanism 
discussed here only applies in the presence of some positive supply. 
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that reduces the costs of uncertainty for sellers does the opposite for buyers.  Thus buyers' 
unexpected changes in demand levels cause price changes in the same direction, due to the 
positive slope of supply curves.  In the short term, especially, when supply responses are 
particularly steep, increases in demand will raise unit prices sharply; decreases in demand will 
benefit from falling prices as well.  Thus the consequences of unexpected outcomes are 
relatively lessened for sellers and relatively exaggerated for buyers, all of whom are 
necessarily encouraged to contribute to smoothing the aggregate adjustment, via the change in 
price. 
 
The startling thing about this whole process is the stark contrast between the seemingly 
almost trivial nature of the elemental parts, the individual trades, and the quite magnificent 
feat of coordination and collective response that emerges, "as if by a hidden hand"10.  In this 
it shares a marked similarity with the process of evolution; both can conjure in some the 
strong conviction that a supervisory agent must be involved11.  For markets, at least, all that is 
necessary, however, is that (a) potential traders are numerous in number and anxious to 
search for the most advantageous deal12 available, (b) some learning opportunity exists for all 
in the market from each transaction, and (c) there is a distinct spatial and temporal framework 
to trading, by which aggregate quantities are formed into discrete values.  In short, there 
needs only to be many searching agents concentrated in space and time, given the realities 
imposed by uncertainty and distance costs13.  Note that this is a significant claim that 
contrasts starkly with the great bulk of the standard literature, which is based on deterministic 
theory as stated above.  It is, however, an approach that is consistent with most economists of 
the Austrian school14, especially Hayek whose great contribution to economics includes 
trenchant criticism  
                                                          
 
10 For an informative treatment of the importance of this familiar claim, and its significant limitations that suggest 
that too simiplistic a blind faith in it will be highly risky, see Hahn  (1981). 
 
11 See footnote 6. 
 
12 This is the key element in achieving efficiency and implies that markets are anonymous, impartial and efficient.  
This also means that efficient markets cannot be discriminatory or in any way biased against any particular 
individual or group  (see Arrow  (1998) for an analysis of non-discrimination by rational market behaviour).  
However, all potential traders in the market may well be subject to credit and trustworthiness assessments in order 
to partake. 
 
13 For a recent and innovative attempt to model the market price formation process without resort to "an exogenous 
Walrasian auctioneer" see Spulber  (1996), where the time costs of search are utilised to achieve a convincing 
model of the equilibrating mechanism that markets generate.  Note that time and space together would improve the 
power of the model and its realism still further. 
 
14 For a recent and highly commendable review of the Austrian school and its potential to extend mainstream 
economic theory see Endres  (1997). 
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of standard theory's reliance on the implausible assumption of certainty, as outlined in Hayek 
(1945). 
 
 
3. The Essential Spatial Structure of Markets 
 
The significance of spatial and temporal concentration of agents relates to the market process 
by which specific aggregate demand and supply levels are discovered.  This discovery 
process is complex and involves all those striving to acquired relevant information on which 
to decide the quantity that each will trade and the price involved.  Eventually varying views 
are blended into a commonly shared pair of values:  the market price and the aggregate 
volume of trade.  To make this possible agents must gather together at a single, market centre 
and for a limited time period within which all trade must be complete.  Within the limited 
trading period only those demands that are immediately actionable and supply quantities 
close enough to be available to a new owner, on the same basis, are significant.  All more 
distant considerations and influences of which traders have some knowledge, contribute to 
their buy or sell decisions, but are excluded from any greater involvement in the final 
determination of actual trades.  This exclusion is essential to enable agents to clinch deals and 
so essential also for the market process to operate15.  The details of the process are outlined 
below. 
 
As previously suggested, uncertainty about price follows from uncertainty about actual 
supply quantities, but the direction of this causality is neither simple nor uniform from all 
perspectives.  It is noteworthy that in the price formation mechanism, causality is reversed 
between the aggregate market mechanism and the operation of individual agents.  The system 
uses the discovery of aggregate quantity, Q, driven by potential buyers seeking supplies, and 
often forced to raise their offer price to meet their future needs, to finally establish the total 
available quantity and the closing market price, P.  For the individual agent utilising this new 
market information, however, it is P, or, more particularly, the agent's local pi derived from it 
by adjusting for the unavoidable costs of distance, that is deemed to determine subsequent  
                                                          
 
15 A specific market can vary markedly from other markets and through succesive time periods.  Arbitrage, subject to 
the same constraints of time and space, will ensure that such variation is strictly limited by profit opportunities 
proportional to any locally extreme values.  Where variation is critical, markets in future responses can 
development and further integrate values across space and time. 
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quantity.  Of course, in an uncertain world neither of these two distinct market relationships is 
at all exact: 
 
(i) markets lack perfect information about the appropriate P, because of 
uncertainty about the future. 
 
(ii) individuals may strive to respond in a deterministic way to a given P, via their 
local pi, but lack total control over quantity. 
 
Furthermore in the real world there is usually a significant time lag between actions and 
effects that allows scope for further imprecision, even in the absence of distortions arising 
from any transaction costs.  None of these sources of error are independent of location of 
individuals relative to the central market. 
 
3.1 Market Information and Location 
 
Markets involve real people with fundamental needs for a safe haven and a means of finding 
or creating sustenance for maintenance within close proximity of that haven, since travel 
takes time and time is scarce.  Opposing this need for safe, private space is the need for social 
contact, which brings a further spatial dimension to the problem.  Add the benefits of trade 
and specialization to this sustenance activity and the collective spatial structure becomes 
considerably concentrated.  Social groups select central places of easy communication that 
become centres for the transfer of information, including importantly, economic information  
and so trade.  Markets eventually become established at these centres and evolve a set of rules 
to facilitate their efficient functioning16. 
 
Markets, thus, are spatial phenomena based on the aggregation of information from a wide  
                                                          
 
16 Hernando de Soto, a Peruvian economist and politician, has argued cogently in an Economist review [de Soto  
(1993)] that much of the success of developed economies has resulted largely from  (a) the wide-spread acceptance 
of property rights, and  (b)  the protective efforts of the owners of property rights.  In particular, owners of 
locations used for markets have obtained protection in the form of restricting trade from occurring elsewhere.  
Unwittingly, this made the market process more efficient by concentrating the number of potential traders and so 
enlarging the size of the market.  Today, high street traders often attempt to curtail the establishment of competing 
suburban developments, in parallel fashion.  Theoretical support for the essential role of clear property rights in 
permitting efficient market development can be traced through Webber  (1972), Alchian  (1974), Furubotn & 
Pejovich  (1974) and most recently Weimer  (1997). 
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area in which all activity, including consumption and production, occurs.  Since information 
is clearly unevenly spread throughout this concentration process, uncertainty, which is surely 
merely the inverse of information17, must also vary across locations.  The process that 
conveys information to a central market place and the effect on price-quantity relations is 
described next. 
 
3.2 The Central Accumulation and Assessment of Information 
 
The broad spatial structure of a market centre in its simplest form, i.e. one with only agents or 
simply-structured entrepreneurial firms and without outside influences like imports or 
exports, starts with a large area in which economic activity is conducted.  Agents have 
property rights over parcels of land on which they conduct various activities, including 
production and consumption for which trade is advantageous.  Agents are mobile and able to 
search out potential trading opportunities, but are neither perfectly informed nor necessarily 
perfectly honest. 
 
Agents are very well informed about the quantitative data relating to their own property and 
locality, noting that this knowledge includes all the quality dimensions of their demand and/or 
supply quantity, but they are less sure of the prevailing market price unless they have recently 
consulted many other agents18.  Visits to the market centre are the most reliable way of 
obtaining good information, especially relevant market information.  Trades may occur away 
from the centre but these do not contribute significantly to market price formation except by 
their negative effects on aggregate volumes, i.e. their diversion of volume reduces the 
efficiency of the price discovery process since the market becomes "thinner".  Such isolated 
trading is also more risky, especially for the less well informed party. 
                                                          
 
17 This statement relates to the widest definition of uncertainty about future events, whether or not they be known, 
rather than an agent's state of awareness.  For a rational agent who can ascribe zero weight to some information, 
there is no distinction between states of knowledge; in particular ignorance can never be more or less blissful than 
having relevant information. 
 
18 In a sense this paper can be seen as an extension of the asymmetric information model of trading initiated by 
Akerlof (1970) in his now famous study of the markets for "lemons".  The uneven knowledge about quality and/or 
quantity  (qi) is shown here to be confronted by an imbalance, typically opposite, in the knowledge of prices. 
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Price discovery occurs only in the central location where sufficient numbers of potential 
traders, well informed about their own volumes, compete for the best deals19.  From this can 
emerge both information about aggregate levels of supply and demand quantities, and hence 
an appropriate market price20.  The key feature of such price-forming market centres is that 
the number of searching traders is sufficient to give confidence that pressures to change the 
terms of potential trades, including especially, the unit price involved can only arise on the 
basis of an imbalance between the aggregate quantities of supplies and demands, so that a 
new price is accepted as common to all.  Both temporal and spatial concentration are essential 
for this process to operate effectively21, as Koopman & Beckmann (1957) established. 
 
3.3 The Transfer of New Information from the Centre 
 
A market clearing price from such a centre is valuable new information that is disseminated 
outwards and is influential for all agents' subsequent decisions.  Time and imperfections in 
communications ensure that a degree of uncertainty is introduced progressively with distance, 
remembering that the material costs of distance must be added to other transaction costs.  
This transfer of information is part of the continual adjustment of the whole market towards 
an equilibrating position, but one that is of course continuously disturbed by stochastic 
variations in quantities.  The dissemination of information about the market, especially the 
price, is driven by three distinct needs of agents: 
 
(i) guidance for investment decisions and trading opportunities, 
(ii) risk aversion within strictly constrained resource levels, and 
(iii) a concern about being duped in any possible local trade. 
                                                          
 
19 Many argue that the rapid developments in electronic data communication weaken the importance of centrality.  
However, the widespread dissemination of market information has most effect on "price-takers", who get no 
special assistance from the equilibrating price mechanism being discussed.  In reality, more efficient 
communication is most likely to shorten response times and intensify the advantages of centrality for price-makers, 
at least.  It also enlarges the scope for misrepresentation. 
 
20  The spatial and temporal dimensions of the market are important in setting limits on quantities.  Only those 
responses that could be actually exercised, in a technical sense, within those limits can be considered, even though 
further demand or supply responses, like imports or exports, might be attracted otherwise.  Note that in the absence 
of precisely defined market volumes, of both demand and supply, a market clearing price could not be formed. 
 
21 A rather old "economist" joke makes essentially this point; an economics professor restrains a young colleague 
from stooping to pick up a $100 bill with the observation that it wouldn't be lying there if it was real.  While the 
jibe against such blind faith in markets may be amusing, the professor's credibility surely rises steeply with the 
density of pedestrian traffic passing by the apparent free good. 
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 The last concern over making unnecessarily disadvantageous trades deserves a brief 
comment.  Although, as is normally relied upon, no agent will accept a trade that is not 
beneficial, the gains from trade can only be objectively judged against the standard of the 
ruling market price.  In the absence of competitive bidding, isolated potential traders enter 
what is essentially a bi-monopolistic bargaining game, in which each side is armed with 
asymmetric information about either quality or price.  Not surprisingly, the possible outcomes 
can range extremely.  Confident knowledge of the state of the market22 is the only effective 
safeguard that any agent can gain against being duped by superior information or bargaining 
skills23. 
 
Knowledge of market conditions can be gained by searching across the entire market for 
evidence of those quantities available and those needed, as well as observing individual 
trades.  The costs involved in this would, however, be prohibitively high, even if the time 
required could somehow be reduced sufficiently to yield relevant current information.  
Alternatively, contacting those agents known to be involved in a particular section of the 
market should provide similar information far more cheaply; the more agents contacted the 
better, remembering that some may be less than forthcoming or prone to errors.  The 
preponderance of well-informed agents will be found at the market centre during trading 
periods, when relevant information will be standardized, consistent and completely up-to-
date, ensuring that making a trip there is likely to be cost effective24 , even for traders dealing 
outside of the centre. 
 
To summarize: high quality information about qi is known locally and communicated 
imperfectly and selectively to the market centre, where the best possible estimate of aggregate 
Q can be formed.  This results in the market price, P, being formed and so knowledge about P 
will always be most reliable at the centre.  This knowledge about P is then disseminated to 
provide local prices, pi, elsewhere.  Agents, in turn, respond to pi by acting to produce an 
                                                          
 
22 Confidence about the market can only come with experience and regular contact with the best informed traders. 
 
23 Note that misrepresentation about quality that is shown to be acute may be offset by legal redress, at a cost, in the 
case of formal contracts.  For a formal analysis of the value of information when forming contacts, and the ability 
to acquire it, see Cremer & Khalil (1992). 
 
24 The information that is necessary for markets to work efficiently is only a small fraction of the total information 
known to all traders, ie. the aggregation process is far from simple.  For example, in an undifferentiated market all 
details of individual suppliers, and the reasons for consumer's demand, are irrelevant. 
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 appropriate output qi; the actual qi that results, in some subsequent period, is aggregated into 
a total market supply, Q, at the market centre, and so on.  In the absence of market trading it 
is the relationship between local price pi, which always higher than the market P because of 
distance costs, and local quantity qi that really matters for local, as opposed to market, 
trading.  Spatial realities, however, ensure that pi and qi behave largely independently of 
market P and Q, principally because any given qi is only weakly related to Q, as argued next. 
 
3.4 The Relationship between Local Prices and Quantities 
 
Even in a market where the basic relationships of supply and demand are well specified and 
known widely, there is every chance that, locally, no such relationship applies.  The main 
reason for this is that variability and uncertainty about the outcome of events is far from 
uniform across the whole market area.  Individuals are variably prone to accidents and 
mistakes, as well as sins and omissions, so too are specific groups like firms and 
organizations; add to this the weather/climate differences between places and it is clear that 
the spatial distribution of actual outcomes is bound to be highly variable from place to place.  
 
A further element reinforcing this is that both supply and demand quantities are involved in 
causing market price adjustments, and rarely are both sides of the market subject to similar sets 
of chance factors.  The major exceptions may be small centres, where physical conditions vary 
little across the limited span of the market area, and some intermediate markets.  In the latter, 
the demand for inputs and services in manufacturing or the market for store stock in primary 
industries for instance, may show some complementary between demand and supply levels. For 
the most part, however, and in large markets especially, the conditions influencing local 
demand and local supply levels will be quite different.  This is most pronounced within small 
localised areas, and certainly in peripheral positions relative to the market centre.  Importers 
and exporters, for instance, experience far higher levels of uncertainty of returns than other 
operators, mainly because the market price in the receiving market is set completely 
independently from production conditions.  Even within one country local conditions can 
produce similar outcomes of nil correlation between price and quantity, as the following 
demonstrates localised events like Wimbledon clearly raise the level of local demand for 
strawberries, yet this cannot be guarantied to raise the market price of strawberries set at 
Covent Garden, London's dominant produce market.  The price would rise for sure only if the  
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extra demand at Wimbledon dominated the normal throughput of Covent Garden, which caters 
normally to London's 12 million or so consumers and many visitors.  In other words, unless the 
local Wimbledon demand, qi, is well related to the market throughput, Q, there is no basis for a 
negative relationship between qi and pi.  The larger the total market the smaller the influence of 
qi on Q and so the weaker the relationship between qi and pi.  Thus local suppliers relying on 
local prices cannot benefit from the income smoothing that central market price formation 
typically provides.  Likewise, local buyers are exposed to considerably greater uncertainty as 
their normally variable demand levels have to cope with a highly unpredictable local price. 
 
 
4. The Spatial Structure of Markets Enabling Price Discovery 
in a World of Temporal and Spatial Uncertainty 
 
Bringing together the findings of the various sections above, it is possible to describe the 
process by which prices and quantities are discovered and incomes determined in a world of 
temporal and spatial uncertainty.  The setting within which this must apply needs noting as a 
world in which, besides uncertainty, everyone needs their space for all aspects of life.  They 
also accept the advantage of specialisation, and the necessity for exchange or trade it creates, 
as highly effective in raising the efficiency of resource use.  The need for trade creates in turn 
the need for central markets.  Such markets are mechanisms of discovery that operate 
continually to resolve the collective ignorance created by permanent demand and supply 
uncertainty.  Markets, then, are sequential processes driven by variations in quantities and 
charged with evaluating both actual quantities and the price that maximises the total benefits 
from exchange.  Variations in quantities arise because expected needs and planned output, 
and the actual outcome at some later time, differ.  Individuals form plans on the basis of 
current expectations about the future but fail to achieve their intentions precisely; if it were 
not so, prices would not need to change frequently, and decentralised trading would be less 
risky. 
 
As shown above the risks of decentralised trading are not uniform but an increasing function 
of distance from the market's centre.  Agents with the most to gain from reducing these risks, 
typically by being frequent and active traders, will be prepared to purchase locations close to 
the centre; the competition for a decreasing number of potential locations nearer to the centre 
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 ensures that location values rise steeply.  Such costly sites near the centre or CBD will allow  
easy and, if used enough, cheap access to the exchange venue, so that owners not only can 
benefit from better trading opportunities, but also, and more importantly, can acquire superior 
knowledge about future prospects within their market.  It is the latter, and the better 
production decisions made possible, that mainly justifies the cost of the location.  Thus 
particular markets will be supplied by distant producers who trade only in the CBD because 
of prohibitive risks, and so lower returns, in the absence of good information, from local 
trade; if the latter does occur it is not fully part of the market. 
 
Thus producers relate the chosen location, and its value, to the benefits to be gained from 
central market access for both trade and especially information to guide future production.  
Consumers, on the other hand, are likely to be quite dispersed in general because their 
location choices are dominated by their alter ego that drives the activity which creates their 
income.  Consumers' reasons for incurring the costs of access to the market are dominated by 
the cost of search to find a suitable product or service, when subject to uncertainty, and 
especially to be confident in their beliefs about the ruling market price.  The consumer's need 
to search for good price information is part of maximising their net benefits, especially when 
market information is inherently unreliable, as shown above, and only made acceptable by 
reference to the central market.  Admittedly the advent of modern communication technology 
has made central market information readily available outside of the centre, with far shorter 
delays than ever before.  Such information, however, must always be dated, and adding to this 
the necessary delays involved in applying it leads to all responses being based on historic data 
for all price-takers based outside of the market. 
 
Both consumers, and importantly producers, can do better by acquiring reliable judgements 
about the future state of the market.  Even as price-takers such superior prior knowledge will 
allow better efficiency of resource use.  In addition, the opportunity for price-making 
strategies is created; these involve adopting short-term disequilibrium positions from which 
future gains are possible.  The key to success in such activities is the quality of information 
about future quantities of both aggregate demand and aggregate supply; a central location is 
virtually essential to superior judgements, or speculations, about the future.   
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5. Market Gardeners and Central Markets 
 
The location choices of market gardeners, which conflict with existing location models and 
provided the stimulus for this paper, can now be understood in terms of the centralised price-
discovery model in the presence of uncertainty.  Market garden crops are intensive, short-
season, harvestable over a significant period and of rapidly deteriorating quality once 
harvested.  Demand is highly dependent on the weather and so causes much variability in 
price, if supply quantities remain much the same.  However, with good quality market 
information and a short enough response time, market gardeners can adjust their supply levels 
to suit demand conditions.  This requires a substantial and ongoing presence in the market-
centre and good contact with market information sources of proven ability.  With these 
advantages a market gardener achieves higher returns, on average, and this goes some way 
towards justifying their expensive locations close to the centre.  In addition, the superior 
knowledge of market behaviour into the future makes possible a further strategy that 
reinforces their on-going viability.  This involves using a succession of short-term crops 
within the growing season.  The harvest period of each crop in the succession is ended as 
soon as its rate of return falls below the level required to maximise the average rate per unit 
of time.  The return to land is maximised by this although the return to each crop is lower 
than static profit maximisation could achieve25.  Each of the critical decision points, short, 
medium and longer term, can vary from season to season and rely heavily on sound 
judgements aided by central market opinions.  Such growers are price-makers using their 
ability to sustain positions of short-term disequilibrium by delaying harvest in poor conditions 
and heavily supplying later at more favourable prices, as well as foregoing normal static 
profit maximisation to achieve superior long-term performance.  However, an alternative 
approach is also possible and often coexists in the same markets. 
 
Some growers supply these same markets from very different locations, that lack the same 
degree of close contact and response rate to the market.  These more peripheral suppliers 
enjoy significantly lower location costs but have poorer market information, slower response 
times and higher transport costs.  Their impact on the central market is similar to that of 
exporters supplying a distant market; they are strictly price-takers relying primarily on lower  
                                                          
 
25 Forestry rotation models, among several others, share this same characteristic. 
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production costs to maintain viability.  They frequently specialise in a single product and 
adopt normal factor optimisation that maximizes the return per crop, because response times 
make rapid successions impractical and land scarcity is less pressing26.  The difference in 
production patterns between the two types of suppliers opens up an important profit 
opportunity for the peripheral suppliers when competition from the higher quality, local 
suppliers ceases as the latter withdraw from the market in order to maintain their crop 
succession. 
 
A third spatial form for such firms is also observed around some large cities.  In such cases 
the owning entrepreneur no longer dominates the two primary functions of production and 
market assessment.  While it is often the case that strengths in these two roles are highly 
complementary and reinforcing, there are economic advantages for further specialisation, 
especially when land costs are specially high and high quality communication exists.  Here 
the entrepreneur is likely to keep the dominant marketing role and employ a manager to 
supervise production, provide information about it to the entrepreneur and to carry out 
decisions taken in the centre.  This eases the time constraints on both roles, but is vulnerable 
to quality losses from communication lapses, lower production performance and management 
conflicts.  Potentially there are gains realisable from generally improved decisions, and 
quicker response times, or an extension to more distant, cheaper locations, but the firm's 
fortunes are now dependent on the joint performance of the two key roles, and that introduces 
both inflexibility and sensitivity to management stresses27. 
 
 
                                                          
 
26 In effect this can be represented as the opportunity cost of delaying the revenue from the succeeding crop dropping 
to zero.  See Scitovsky (1971) for a full analysis of dynamic, as opposed to static, efficiency.  Seasonal patterns of 
growth frequently make crop sequences discontinuous in the absence of expensive environment changing 
investment.  A closely related and active research area is Option-Price Theory, which was recently reviewed by 
Nobel laureate Robert Merton [Merton (1998)]. 
 
27 This model is basically applicable to all modern firms that maintain a head-office in the CBD from which 
production and marketing decision are issued to production units situated well outside at cheaper locations.  The 
location options for such production is a different problem entirely and much dependent on the spatially related 
influences on factor supply, especially labour.  For a complete analysis, but without the benefit of the spatial 
dimension, see Shi & Yang (1998). 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The central finding of the paper is that market centres are caused by the efforts of agents to 
cope with spatial and temporal uncertainty.  With the prevalence of continuous variability 
across space and time, efficient exchange between agents is highly desirable and requires all 
agents in the market to assemble in a single location at the same time.  Only by doing so can 
the aggregate quantity of potential consumers' demands and the available supply quantities 
from many dispersed locations be assessed for immediate transfer at a price that maximises 
the aggregate benefit.  This also sets a limit on the market's geographic extent, without which 
a definitive market clearing price is unattainable.  The incentives motivating individual agents 
to contribute to the central aggregation of information arise from the benefits to be attained 
from partaking in the "pooling" of their situation, through trade28, with the other participants 
in the market, and the high costs of failing to search for the best available opportunity.  
Spatial centralisation is essential to the price-forming process, making feasible economic 
exchanges to the real advantage of all within the extent of the market, but in doing so it also 
introduces greater spatial variation between localities in the degree and effective cost of 
uncertainty.  These latter costs essentially increase exponentially with distance from the 
centre, making peripherally located agents similar to exporters and importers, who utilise the 
market from outside, but always as pre-committed price-takers, in any given market period29.  
Such outside traders exercise important links between price-forming centres using spatial 
arbitrage to ensure that all prices move in unison, within the limits imposed by the 
unavoidable costs and delays of distance. 
 
                                                          
 
28 An exactly similar case is usually made for trade in general.  See for example Wong & Yang (1998) who state "an 
increase in the size of an economy ... enlarges agents' scope for trading off economies of scale for consumption 
diversity, per capita real income, the number of goods and productivity increase with the size of an economy if 
there is a fixed cost in production.  This implies that international trade will increase per capita real income and 
productivity because the size of the pooling economy in the integrated world market is larger than any individual 
country".  (page 186 in Arrow, Ng and Yang (1998). 
 
29  Recent support for the essential role of market centres in economic systems can be found, albeit based on 
restrictive assumptions, in Quinzii & Thisse (1990), and for the influence of uncertainty on optimal location in 
Katz (1984). 
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Many rich new opportunities for extension of this work arise, both in theoretical 
developments encompassing an additional spatial dimension into economic theory30 and in 
analysing many challenging applications.  Among the latter are the as yet unclear impacts of 
new retail centres, such as malls and suburban centres, within established markets of most 
modern cities.  Two pressing questions in need of resolution relate to the appropriate limiting 
price margin, relative to the centre, for long-term stability and efficiency, and the implications 
for efficient pricing with such trade diversion and the consequent "thinning" of the central 
market.  The latter is especially interesting in the context of electronic trading on the inter-net, 
which introduces similar effects.  The model developed in this paper suggests that such 
trading will be unworkable as a general process, and in the absence of a related conventional 
market, unless some means can be found to restrict trading temporally into distinct time 
periods and some mechanism is developed to allow reliable predictions of future market 
conditions.  Hopefully, this paper's spatial model of price-formation can contribute more than 
a starting point for such work. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
30 A number of earlier attempts exist [Greenhut (1974), Eaton and Lipsey (1977), Greenhut (1978), Dorward (1981) 
and Greenhut (1981)] but none have dealt with the spatial needs of price formation, which is clearly of the 
fundamental core of economics.  Recently a noted authority on spatial economics referred to the value still to come 
from further assimilation: "Thus it remains an open question whether mainstream economics ignores something 
essential in neglecting space." - Arnott (1987) page 430. 
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